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The canon that dictates that words be interpreted according to their ordinary meaning has 
been widely debated. Many studies have either highlighted the shortcomings of the ordinary 
meaning principle or have tried to debunk its existence altogether. Despite efforts to introduce 
a new approach to the interpretation of statutes in South Africa (through Endumeni), the 
application of the ordinary meaning rule persists and remains a contested issue. Weighing in 
on the debate by scholars such as Cowen (1980) and Labuschagne (1998), this contribution 
tests if the phenomenon of ordinary meaning actually exists. Rooted in the argument that 
ordinary meaning is representative of a so-called reasonable speaker’s understanding, data 
were collected through a survey approach. The survey tested ten words taken from South 
African case law that were interpreted according to the ordinary meaning principle. The 
results were then compared with the meanings assigned by the respective courts and those 
appearing in the iWeb corpus. Interpreted against the demographic information of 151 
participants, the preliminary results indicate correspondence between the courts’ 
understanding of the selected words and that of the respondents. Therefore, the findings 
cautiously confirm the existence of the ordinary meaning principle as a phenomenon within 
a specific spectrum of society.   
 
I INTRODUCTION  
(a) Defining ‘ordinary meaning’ 
There is no better guarantee of binding a judge to the law, says Smith, than through the wording 
of the law.1 The interpretation of a statute usually starts with the words of legislation 
themselves.2 This relationship between law and language is one of instrumentality; ultimately, 
law uses language to accomplish certain objectives.3 Bix describes this instrumentality as 
                                                          
 MA (UP) PhD (UFS). 
1 C E Smith ‘Het woord als grenswachter: Functies van taalkundige interpretatie voor de rechtsvinding’ (2009) 
2 Themis 61 at 61, 63. 
2 Frederick Schauer Thinking Like a Lawyer (2009) 151. According to Schauer, many controversies centre 
around the question of whether words should also be the ending point of legal interpretation.    
3 Ralf Poscher ‘Ambiguity and vagueness in legal interpretation’ in Peter M Tiersma & Lawrence M Solan 
(eds) The Oxford Handbook of Language and Law (2012) 133. One such objective is ‘meaning-generation’; a text 
must be interpreted to give it meaning. In this regard, see Marius van Staden & Stefan van Eck ‘”Deemed” to be 
an employee: Adopting the teleological interpretation of statutes’ (2018) 30 SA Mercantile Law Journal 416 at 
419. 
Pre-published version of the article available in SALJ 
guidance: law is guided by language.4 One such guiding instrument is the ordinary meaning 
rule. The rule of law in many countries determines that when a contested word, phrase or 
sentence is undefined within legislation, it must be given its ‘ordinary meaning’,5 which means 
its clear, everyday meaning.6 It is impractical, if not impossible, for a legislator to define every 
word in an Act. Also, errors occur in the language used to enact laws.7 Understandably, this 
leaves plenty of room for interpretation and subsequent squabbles. If a word has more than one 
possible ordinary meaning, the relevant context must be studied for clarity.8 A court may veer 
from the indicated ordinary meaning only in the event that such a word is absurd, leads to 
injustice,9 or when the wording is ‘unsuccessful in conveying a perfectly clear message’.10 As 
such, ordinary meaning functions almost like a supervisory body, whose task is to explain what 
is meant, within reason and within set boundaries.11 Though ordinary meaning has a function 
of setting boundaries within which interpretation should take place and expresses the distance 
between the ordinary and the legal or technical definition, it is not easily deducible beforehand 
where these boundaries must lie.12 Slocum describes the ordinary meaning rule as 
                                                          
4 Brian H Bix ‘Legal interpretation and the philosophy of language’ in Peter M Tiersma & Lawrence M Solan 
(eds) The Oxford Handbook of Language and Law (2012) 145. 
5 D V Cowen ‘The interpretation of statutes and the concept of “the intention of the legislator”’ (1980) 43 
THRHR 374 at 379–80; Lawrence M Solan ‘Linguistic issues and statutory interpretation’ in Peter M Tiersma & 
Lawrence M Solan (eds) The Oxford Handbook of Language and Law (2012) 94. In a different publication, Solan 
keenly observes that the definitions themselves can be ambiguous and troublesome, seeing as they are also 
formulated using words and structured syntactically; see Lawrence M Solan The Language of Statutes. Laws and 
Their Interpretation (2010) 23. However, despite potential tautologies or obscurities, a court still needs to give 
defined words some meaning – see Lourens Marthinus Du Plessis Re-Interpretation of Statutes (2002) 204.  
6 Christopher Hutton Word Meaning and Legal Interpretation: An Introductory Guide (2014) 39. One of the 
assumptions here is that the legislator does not speak in riddles – see David A Strauss ‘Why plain meaning’ (1997) 
72 Notre Dame Law Review 1565 at 1573; Du Plessis op cit note 5 at 103–4. 
7 Solan op cit note 5 at 4. 
8 J M T Labuschagne ‘Gewone betekenis van ŉ woord, woordeboek en die organiese aard van uitleg’ (1998) 
13 South African Public Law 145 at 145; John Bell & George Engle Cross Statutory Interpretation (1995) 49. 
9 Cowen op cit note 5 at 380–81; Labuschagne ibid at 145; Gail-Maryse Cockram Interpretation of Statutes 
(1987) 36–48; Bell & Engle ibid at 49. The application of the ordinary meaning rule can also lead to absurdity, as 
illustrated by the debate between legal philosophers HLA Hart and Lon Fuller. In this regard, see Schauer op cit 
note 2 at 152–55. In the event of obvious absurdity and ambiguity, a court may venture beyond the text in search 
of clarity; see Linda D Jellum & David Charles Hricik Modern Statutory Interpretation. Problems, Theories, and 
Lawyering Strategies (2006) 73–4, 80; see also Du Plessis op cit note 5 at 103–104. 
10 J de Ville ‘Meaning and statutory interpretation’ (1999) 62 THRHR 373 at 387. Also see Peter M Tiersma 
Legal Language (1999) 126. Tiersma points out that the plain meaning rule constrains meaning within statutes to 
the words and sentences used by the legislator, rather than exploring the intention of the speaker; Bell and Engle 
op cit note 8 at 49; Schauer op cit note 2 at 157.  
11 Ralph Christensen & Christian Kübbeler ‘Wortlautgrenze und Wörterbuch’ (2011) 2 Zerl 1 at 1; F T 
Groenewegen ‘De relatieve waarde van de grammaticale interpretatiemethode’ in E T Feteris, H Kloosterhuis, H 
J Plug & J A Pontier (eds) Alles Afwegende: Bijdragen aan het Vijfde Symposium Juridische Argumentatie, 22 
Juni 2007 te Rotterdam (2007) 243; Dietrich Busse ‘Was ist die Bedeutung eines Gesetzestextes? 
Sprachwissenschaftliche Argumente im Methodenstreit der Juristischen Auslegungslehre – Linguistisch Gesehen’ 
in Friedrich Müller (ed) Untersuchungen zur Rechtslinguistik. Interdisziplinäre Studien zu Praktischer Semantik 
und Strukturierender Rechtslehre in Grundfragen der Juristischen Methodik (1989) 132. 
12 Hutton op cit note 6 at 42. 
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‘foundational’ in the interpretation of most legal text types.13 He goes further by saying that 
determining ordinary meaning is often the first step in the process of the interpretation of 
statutes and usually forms the basis for the application of a court’s other interpretive tools.14 
The act of determining meaning happens alongside jurisprudential debate and is often linked 
to the purpose of the legislation.15  
Ordinary meaning, as a legal rule, remains a contested issue and is an elusive concept to 
many people. Synonyms used to describe it, such as ‘everyday’, ‘grammatical’, ‘literal’ or even 
‘natural meaning’,16 are often as problematic as the term itself.17 The fact that words such as 
‘everyday’, ‘grammatical’ and ‘natural meaning’ remain undefined in many legal systems18 
only begs the question: Who determines what these words mean? Therefore, what constitutes 
an everyday word may differ greatly from one person to the next.19 This becomes apparent 
when we realise that, for many people, everyday language is synonymous with commonsense 
language, which is never found in official documentation.20 The issue is further compounded 
in multilingual countries where the law is practised in a lingua franca, with which citizens 
might not be fully conversant or in which communication skills are limited to conversational 
registers.21 If asked what the word ‘money’ means, how would an additional language speaker 
of English define it? Would a court of law be satisfied with such a definition? Following Oliver 
                                                          
13 Brian G Slocum ‘Linguistics and “ordinary meaning” determinations’ (2012) 33 Statute Law Review 39 at 
40; Van Staden & Van Eck op cit note 3 at 418. 
14 Slocum ibid at 40; Strauss op cit note 6 at 1565, 1566–67.   
15 Bell & Engle op cit note 8 at 31–2. 
16 Cowen op cit note 5 at 379; Labuschagne op cit note 8 at 145; Smith op cit note 1 at 62–3.; Du Plessis op 
cit note 5 at 108, 199. 
17 The complexity is exacerbated when distinctions are made between words like ‘ordinary’ and ‘literal’, for 
instance. These distinctions are not adhered to by everyone; sometimes these words are used interchangeably. 
This is also visible in South African case law (see note 73 below). For typical synonyms, see Brian G Slocum 
Ordinary Meaning (2015) 287–88. For distinctions, see Robert S Summers & Geoffrey Marshall ‘The argument 
from ordinary meaning in statutory interpretation’ (1992) 43 Northern Ireland Legal Quarterly 213 at 215–16. 
Further distinctions are made by Bell & Engle (op cit note 8 at 63–8), between ‘ordinary’, ‘primary’, ‘secondary’ 
and ‘fringe’ meanings. 
18 R M Klopper & N J C van den Bergh ‘Die toepasbaarheid van die modern linguistiese benadering op 
wetsuitleg’ (1980) 5 Tydskrif vir Regswetenskap 1, in general. 
19 Hutton op cit note 6 at 56. 
20 In the words of Du Plessis (op cit note 5 at 201): ‘Usage and convention furthermore dictate that statutory 
and constitutional language cannot be slang […]’.  
21 Georgina Heydon & Eliseu Mabasso ‘The impact of multilingualism on reporting domestic violence in 
Mozambique’ (2018) 49 Language Matters 84, in general; Jan Engberg ‘Word meaning and the problem of a 
globalized legal order’ in Peter M Tiersma & Lawrence M Solan (eds) The Oxford Handbook of Language and 
Law (2012) 175; Zakeera Docrat The Role of African Languages in the South African Legal System: Towards a 
Transformative Agenda (unpublished MA thesis, Rhodes University, 2017) in general; Rosemary Henrietta 
Moeketsi Of African Languages and Forensic Linguistics: The South African Multilingual and Multicultural 
Criminal Courtroom (unpublished PhD dissertation, University of South Africa, 1997) in general. 
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Wendell Holmes, Smith states that the meaning assigned to a word by a presiding officer must 
be the same as the meaning given to that word by the ordinary language user.22   
Some scholars have tried to define what ‘ordinary meaning’ is,23 while others have tried to 
debate whom the concept is actually meant for.24 The existence of ordinary meaning has also 
been questioned.25 Some are of the opinion that there is no such thing as ordinary meaning.26 
For them, meaning can be constructed only through its context and should never be divorced 
from the act of legal interpretation.27 A similar point is made by Christensen, who argues that 
meaning is not something that can be determined before a legal argument is constructed.28 He 
does not see ordinary meaning as an innate characteristic of a text, but rather as a relational 
phenomenon that forms part of a semantic chain and a broader culture of legal interpretation. 
Ordinary meaning must therefore be seen as relations within a larger network of meaning. De 
Ville states that not only does the construction of meaning depend on language and exists 
through the interplay between text and interpreter,29 but it also remains unstable.30 Meaning is 
                                                          
22 Smith op cit note 1 at 63. See also Slocum op cit note 17 at 4. This links to what Tiersma (op cit note 10 at 
115–16) says, that the meaning of a term is dependent on how it is used. This notion is not new, but rather 
something associated with Ludwig Wittgenstein’s idea of ‘use as meaning’. However, Tiersma argues that a public 
body like a legislator is not prescriptive, unless they define a word for a specific purpose. In that case, the word’s 
meaning is authoritative. 
23 Its definition should explicitly include the label ‘legal fiction’, see Hutton op cit note 6 at 56 and Christensen 
& Kübbeler op cit note 11 at 7-9.   
24 J M T Labuschagne ‘Die woord as kommunikasiebasis in die wetgewingsproses’ (1988) 3 South African 
Public Law 34 at 42. Labuschagne mostly argued that there is no such thing as an ordinary meaning, but if it did 
exist, it was limited to the understanding of legal scholars and law practitioners and not something involving the 
public. A similar sentiment was expressed by Hoexter JA in Finbro Furnishers (Pty) Ltd v Registrar of Deeds, 
Bloemfontein (129/84) [1985] ZASCA 71, paras 70–1: The natural or ordinary meaning should be viewed through 
the eyes of someone who knows the subject matter, who is not ignorant of what the word means within this 
specific context. See also Strauss op cit note 6 at 1568. 
25 Labuschagne op cit note 8 in general; Hutton op cit note 6 in general; Terrence R Carney & Luna Bergh 
‘Exploring the different ordinary meanings in ritualised and ceremonial courtroom practices and their relation to 
everyday ritual’. Paper presented at the Linguistics Society of Southern Africa / Southern African Applied 
Linguistics Association / Southern African Association for Language Teaching Joint Annual Conference 2016, 
Cape Town. 
26 Cowen op cit note 5 at 386; Labuschagne op cit note 8 at 146; J M T Labuschagne ‘Regsnormvorming: 
Riglyn vir ŉ nuwe benadering tot die tradisionele reëls van wetsuitleg’ (1989) 4 South African Public Law 205 at 
208; A Soeteman ‘Het nutteloze nut van grammaticale interpretatie’ in E T Feteris, H Kloosterhuis, H J Plug & J 
A Pontier (eds) Alles Afwegende: Bijdragen aan het Vijfde Symposium Juridische Argumentatie, 22 Juni 2007 te 
Rotterdam (2007) 257–58; Hutton op cit note 6 at 197. 
27 Cowen op cit note 5 at 386, 391; J M T Labuschagne ‘Die begrip “dubbelsinnigheid” by wetsuitleg’ (1987) 
12 Tydskrif vir Regswetenskap 96 at 99; Labuschagne op cit note 8 at 147; see also Klopper & Van den Bergh op 
cit note 18 at 10. 
28 Ralph Christensen ‘Wortlautgrenze’ available at http://www.rechtslinguistik.de/glossar_jm/index.htm, 
accessed on 12 March 2019. 
29 Busse (op cit note 11 at 148) reminds readers that interpretation can never be free of the intentions of the 
interpreter; see also Du Plessis op cit note 5 at 110, 199. 
30 De Ville op cit note 10 at 375, 380; Christensen & Kübbeler (op cit note 11 at 5) on presiding officers: ‘Er 
arbeitet mit und durch die Sprache.’ [He works with and through language.] 
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unstable because it is ever changing and elusive. De Ville’s postmodernist31 approach extends 
to the instability of context; he refers to context as ‘boundless’,32 implying that a sound 
dependence on context to infer a word’s meaning should be done with caution, since it provides 
no guarantee of clarity. 
The postmodernist notion that meaning is elusive remains a somewhat foreign concept in a 
legal system that has been shaped by textualism and intentionalism. Both these theories of 
interpretation relied on the sovereignty of a text and the straightforwardness of the words 
embedded within. Meaning was usually gleaned from the word itself or by studying its syntax 
(and grammar). This idea is strongly vested in a structuralist school of thought. Structuralism 
was dominant between the 1920s and the 1960s (coinciding with the periods of textualism and 
intentionalism). Structuralists viewed language as a large system and meaning was always 
constructed inside this system. They saw reality not as things but as signs, and these signs 
always stood in relation to one another. In turn, the relations revealed permanent structures. 
Because the system cannot change, meaning can only be inferred by studying the relations, the 
structures and the entire system; nothing exists outside of the system.33 The belief that a word’s 
‘ordinary meaning’ will simply reveal itself when studying its immediate context (its sentence, 
paragraph or the entire Act) relates to the structuralist’s idea of meaning making.   
However, individuals like Jacques Derrida stressed the fact that words have more than one 
meaning, which could lead to a multitude of possibilities. This means language can no longer 
be seen as a closed system, a belief shared by cognitive semanticists for whom meaning 
construction goes beyond our immediate world.34 The distinction between word meaning and 
speaker meaning is blurred and ‘context’ now includes encyclopaedic and experiential 
knowledge.35 When meaning construction is viewed in this way, the concept of an ‘ordinary 
meaning’ as the language output of ‘ordinary people’ can (finally) be interrogated.    
  
(b) A new standard for interpretation 
Labuschagne opines that because the legislator is dependent on language to communicate with 
its people, it would be erroneous to assume that the law would always be infallible and precise 
                                                          
31 One of the fundamental axioms of postmodernism is that there is no such thing as an absolute truth; it is not 
possible to speak of ‘the truth’ or ‘the meaning’. See Jeff Malpas ‘Retrieving truth: Modernism, postmodernism 
and the problem of truth’ (1992) 75 Soundings 287, in general; Peter Salmon ‘The moment of truth’ (2018) Spring 
New Humanist 26 at 30. 
32 De Ville op cit note 10 at 375–6, 381, 384. 
33 Dirk Geeraerts Theories of Lexical Semantics (2010) 48–50.   
34 Geeraerts op cit note 33 at 182. 
35 Ibid at 204. 
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in its formulation.36 Furthermore, this would assume that people are exactly the same and that 
words always have the same meaning. This is, of course, not true. Words are ambiguous, vague 
and sometimes unknown, despite their context.37 Or, as Solan puts it, “the most pervasive 
linguistic problem confronting statutory interpreters concerns what to do when an event occurs 
that could legitimately be described by the statutory word, but typically one would not use that 
word in those circumstances to describe the situation.”38 This links to what Busse has argued: 
the theories used to interpret statutes and set the necessary legal boundaries draw the interpreter 
into a semantic discussion.39 It becomes a dichotomy of determining and fixing meaning.40 The 
issue is complicated further by questioning whose meaning should be dealt with. As Lee and 
Mouritsen state, words are not only used differently by people from diverse speech 
communities, but they also differ between registers.41 All of this leaves courts and legal 
practitioners with semantic and pragmatic challenges, for which solutions are often sought in 
dictionaries and case law.42  
Even though studies have demystified the idea that ordinary meaning is equal to a dictionary 
definition,43 and despite the fact that a number of alternative approaches to statutory 
interpretation are available,44 dictionary definitions, on the one hand, and examples and 
                                                          
36 Labuschagne op cit note 27 at 96. 
37 For a good discussion on ambiguity and vagueness in law, see Poscher op cit note 3. Also see Labuschagne 
op cit note 27 at 97; Michael S Moore ‘Do we have an unwritten constitution’ (1989) California Law Review 107 
at 130-31; Schauer op cit note 2 at 157. 
38 Solan op cit note 5 at 92. 
39 Dietrich Busse ‘Semantische Regeln und Rechtsnormen. Ein Grundproblem von Gesetzesbindung und 
Auslegungsmethodik in Linguistischer Sicht’ in Rudolf Mellinghoff and Hans H Trutz (eds) Die 
Leistungsfähigkeit des Rechts – Methodik, Gentechnologie, Internationales Verwaltungsrecht (1988) 23; see also 
Dennis Davis ‘The twist of language and the two Fagans: Please sir may I have some more literalism!’ (1996) 12 
South African Journal of Human Rights 504 at 509; and Christensen & Kübbeler op cit note 11 at 2. 
40 Busse op cit note 36 at 24. This is an important observation by Busse. It implies that meaning is not 
something that is found, but rather something that is constructed. And once it is constructed, that specific meaning 
stands. See also Roger Colinvaux ‘What is law? A search for legal meaning and good judging under a textualist 
lens’ (1997) 72 Indiana Law Review 1133 at 1151; and Tiersma op cit note 10 at 129-130. 
41  Thomas R Lee & Stephen C Mouritsen ‘Judging ordinary meaning’ (2018) 127 Yale Law Review 788 at 
827.  
42 As in most countries, South African courts are allowed to refer to precedent judgments; see Cockram op cit 
note 9 at 148-151; Bell & Engle op cit note 8 at 59; Schauer op cit note 2 at 36–41.   
43 Lawrence Solan ‘When judges use the dictionary’ (1993) 68 American Speech 50; Note Harvard Law 
Review (1994) 107 ‘Looking it up: Dictionaries and statutory interpretation’ 1437 (law student note; unsigned); 
Ellen P Aprill ‘The law of the word: Dictionary shopping in the Supreme Court’ (1998) 30 Arizona State Law 
Journal 275; Stephen C Mouritsen ‘The dictionary is not a fortress: Definitional fallacies and a corpus-based 
approach to plain meaning’ 2010 Brigham Young University Law Review 1915, Samuel A Thumma & Jeffrey 
Kirchmeier ‘The lexicon has become a fortress: The United States Supreme Court’s use of dictionaries’ (1999) 
47 Buffalo Law Review 241, Terrence R Carney ‘ŉ Forensies-semantiese beskouing van die woordgebruik 
“onkoste” in die hofsaak CSARS v Labat Africa Ltd’ (2012) 30 Southern African Linguistics and Applied 
Language Studies 487. 
44 Not all alternative approaches might be practical or helpful to judiciary systems that suffer from workload 
and time and money constraints, but legal practitioners and presiding officers now have the luxury of choosing. 
Alternative approaches include: The Natural Semantic Metalanguage model (Cliff Goddard ‘Can linguists help 
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theories of interpretation taken from case law, on the other, continue to be the most common 
way to deal with contested words and phrases.45 However, the most recent guideline for legal 
interpretation in South Africa, put forward in Natal Joint Municipal Pension Fund v Endumeni 
Municipality,46 departs somewhat from the ordinary meaning rule. Writing for a full bench, 
Wallis JA sets the following standard for what he refers to as the proper approach:   
Interpretation is the process of attributing meaning to the words used in a document, be it legislation, 
some other statutory instrument, or contract, having regard to the context provided by reading the 
particular provision or provisions in the light of the document as a whole and the circumstances 
attendant upon its coming into existence. Whatever the nature of the document, consideration must 
be given to the language used in the light of the ordinary rules of grammar and syntax; the context 
in which the provision appears; the apparent purpose to which it is directed and the material known 
to those responsible for its production. Where more than one meaning is possible each possibility 
must be weighed in the light of all these factors.47 
He goes on to say that a ‘sensible meaning’ should be sought and that judges must tread 
carefully not to ‘substitute’ the actual words used for words they consider to be ‘reasonable, 
                                                          
judges know what they mean? Linguistic semantics in the court-room’ (1996) 3 Forensic Linguistics 250; Ian 
Langford ‘Forensic semantics: The meaning of murder, manslaughter and homicide’ (2000) 7 Forensic Linguistics 
1350) and most notably, corpus linguistics (Malcolm Coulthard ‘On the use of corpora in the analysis of forensic 
text’ (1994) 1 Forensic Linguistics 27; Mouritsen op cit note 43; Lawrence M Solan & Tammy Gales ‘Finding 
ordinary meaning in law: The judge, the dictionary or the corpus? (2016) 1 International Journal of Legal 
Discourse 253; Friedemann Vogel, Hanjo Hamann & Isabelle Gauer ‘Computer-assisted legal linguistics: Corpus 
analysis as a new tool for legal studies’ (2017) 43 Law & Social Inquiry 1340; Lee & Mouritsen op cit note 41). 
In South Africa, the use of frame semantics (Terrence R Carney ‘Using frames to determine ordinary meaning in 
court cases: The case of “plant” and “vermin”’ (2016) 45 Stellenbosch Papers in Linguistics 31) and prototype 
theory (TR Carney & L Bergh ‘Using prototype theory to determine the ordinary meaning of words’ (2016) 79 
THRHR 486; SP van Zyl & TR Carney ‘A cry for certainty as to the application of “accrued to” for purposes of 
section 1 of the Income Tax Act 58 of 1962’ (2018) 81 THRHR 484) have also been illustrated as a possible means 
to establish the ordinary meaning of words with or without the aid of dictionaries. For semantic analysis, see 
Michael S Moore ‘Plain meaning and linguistics: A case study’ (1995) 73 Washington University Law Quarterly 
in general. Some of these approaches have at least been utilised in American court cases: With reference to corpus 
linguistic approaches, see Sate v Rasabout 2015 UT 72 356 P3d 1258; People v Harris 72 Ill 2d 16 377 NE2d 28, 
1978 Ill17 Ill Dec 838; Muscarello v United States (524 US 125 (1998)), and United States v Costello (666 F3d 
1040 (2012)). With reference to prototype theory, see Magnesium Elektron North America Inc. v National Union 
Fire Insurance Company Pittsburgh Ill 3d unreported case, cause no 12 MR 336 (14 June 2018). 
45 See, for instance, Harvey NO and Others v Crawford NO and Others 2019 (2) SA 153 (SCA); CSARS v 
Daikin Air Conditioning (185/2017) [2018] ZASCA 66; CSARS v Big G Restaurants (Pty) Ltd (157/18) [2018] 
ZASCA 179; Smyth v Investec Bank Ltd and Another 2018 (1) SA 494 (SCA); CSARS v Bosch 2015 (2) SA 174 
(SCA); Bothma-Batho Transport (Edms) Bpk v S Bothma & Seun Transport (Edms) Bpk 2014 (2) SA 494 (SCA); 
S v Okah 2018 (1) SACR 492 (CC); S v Liesching 2019 (1) SACR 178 (CC); S v Pedro 2015 (1) SACR 42 (WCC); 
S v Jordaan 2018 (1) SACR 522 (WCC); Masstores (Pty) Ltd v Pick ‘n Pay Retailers (Pty) Ltd 2016 (2) SA 586 
(SCA); Marine 3 Technologies Holdings (Pty) Ltd v Afrigroup Investments (Pty) Ltd 2015 (2) SA 387 (SCA); 
Democratic Alliance v Speaker, National Assembly 2016 (3) SA 487 (CC). 
46 2012 (4) SA 593 (SCA). For an argument in favour of the teleological model of interpretation, which focuses 
on the purpose of statutory provisions, see Van Staden & Van Eck op cit note 3 at 426–31.  
47 Para 18; see also C E Smith ‘Enkele varianten van taalkundige interpretatie’ in E T Feteris, H Kloosterhuis, 
H J Plug & J A Pontier (eds) Alles Afwegende: Bijdragen aan het Vijfde Symposium Juridische Argumentatie, 22 
Juni 2007 te Rotterdam (2007) 250. 
Pre-published version of the article available in SALJ 
sensible or businesslike’.48 This is similar to what Slocum has observed – courts ‘often favour 
inappropriately broad meanings’ to capture what is ‘possible’, rather than what is ‘ordinary’.49 
According to Wallis JA, the language must be considered together with the context, 
simultaneously and in equal measure.50 Seeking the intention of legislative draftsmen is no 
longer encouraged, since these enquiries are unhelpful and unreliable.51 Boldly, Wallis JA also 
does away with the notion of an ‘ordinary grammatical meaning’, implying that it is an outdated 
approach that does not help to clarify vague or ambiguous words.52 Where the context does not 
elucidate the meaning, the court must assign a meaning through restriction or extension.53 
Furthermore, Wallis JA notes that the language must be interpreted as it is understood at the 
time of contestation. 
Ultimately, Wallis JA’s proper approach imprisons meaning within the text being contested. 
This implies a very restricted, structuralist interpretation, in which the context is tied to the text 
and the language system itself. The language is then studied synchronically without considering 
a broader network of meaning. In doing so, we can indeed no longer speak of an ordinary 
meaning, or the meaning used by ordinary, reasonable people. The notion that meaning could 
be sought outside an Act and its addenda (and by implication its grammar and syntax) remains 
moot. Endumeni creates no space for pragmatic meaning, that is, meaning constructed through 
lived experiences in which the context goes beyond the immediate text. Endumeni would have 
had a far richer yield if meaning were to be interpreted conceptually instead of 
structuralistically.  
Therefore, despite the new direction suggested by Wallis JA in Endumeni, contested words 
still need clarification, and where a court has to deal with a non-technical word, it will most 
likely be dealt with according to its ordinary or everyday characteristics, as understood in its 
                                                          
48 Para 18. 
49 Slocum op cit note 13 at 40. 
50 Para 19. This viewpoint is strongly supported by Groenewegen (op cit note 11 at 239–40, 242), who believes 
that grammatical meaning can in no way contribute any clarity outside of context. To him, vagueness is exactly 
resultant of meaning apart from its immediate, syntactical context. However, recent judgments have criticised the 
application of Endumeni, saying that a broadened focus on context has led to an increase in inadmissible evidence 
and textual interpretation. See The City of Tshwane Metropolitan Municipality v Blair Atholl Homeowners 
Association (106/2018) [2018] ZASCA 176 (3 December 2018), and ABC (Pty) Ltd v Commissioner for the South 
African Revenue Services (14287) [2019] ZASCA (12 June 2019). 
51 Paras 20-4; Cowen (op cit note 5 at 382–4) makes the interesting observation that presiding officers often 
refer to the intentions of the legislator when they actually seek to understand the meaning of the words used by 
the legislator. 
52 Para 25; see once more Groenewegen, op cit note 11. 
53 Para 25. 
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textualist sense.54 Slocum points out a number of reasons why the ordinary meaning doctrine 
is influential: it functions best as a default rule when disputes become costly, it is a democratic 
approach that is (supposedly) free from political control, it could be seen as the best indication 
of legislative purpose, and it is ‘more consistent with the judiciary’s other tools of 
interpretation’, which favour narrower interpretation.55  
     
(c)  Problem statement 
 
In many respects, the ordinary meaning rule is reliant on two assumptions, namely  
 the legal fiction of the reasonable person, and  
 the legal fiction of the speaker of ordinary language.56 
Though the reasonable person can be described as someone with ordinary intelligence and 
development,57 the term remains problematic.58 Who exactly qualifies as a reasonable person? 
Is it the same as an average person? Is someone with a higher education and a good command 
of language more reasonable than an unschooled person with commonsense language use? 
What about people who are more conservative than others? Are people belonging to different 
age groups or cultural assimilations equally reasonable? Reasonability is a relative concept and 
different for each individual or community.59 It is also dependent on the circumstances and 
needs of each case.60 The reasonable person is, practically speaking, Joe Soap. He or she is an 
ordinary commuter, neighbour, office worker and consumer. Even if he or she is capable of 
higher thought and problem-solving, this individual uses standard or commonsense language 
                                                          
54 Perumalsamy aptly illuminates the stark contrast of courts that seemingly agree with the new approach to 
interpretation set by Endumeni, but end up doing the very opposite of what the judgment dictates by invoking 
textualist principles instead. See Kessler Perumalsamy ‘The life and times of textualism in South Africa’ (2019) 
22 PELJ 1 at 12-13.  
55 Slocum op cit note 17 at 5, 8-10.  
56 Hutton op cit note 6 at 44; Summers & Marshall (op cit note 17 at 220) very vaguely describe an ordinary 
language user as a competent individual, who is also ‘a purposive user, but in a qualified way’. 
57 J Neethling, J M Potgieter & P J Visser Dilektereg (1996) 332. For instance, American tort law does not 
value cognitive abilities as a characteristic of a reasonable person, but American trade law does. See Laura A 
Heymann ‘The reasonable person in trademark law’ (2008) 52 St Louis University Law Journal 781 at 782. 
58 The term seldom has a fixed meaning, making it very vague. See Sandra F Sperino ‘Retaliation and the 
reasonable person’ (2015) 67 Florida Law Review 2031 at 2053. Its definition also changes to some degree 
according to its context. See Heymann ibid at 784. 
59 See also Richard A Posner The Problems of Jurisprudence (1990) 263. 
60 See also Donald Braman ‘Cultural cognition and the reasonable person’ (2010) 14 Lewis & Clark Law 
Review 1455 at 1456, footnote 2.  
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to navigate daily life. A reasonable person knows the basics of right and wrong behaviour; 
what is permissible and what is not.61    
There is also the belief that this reasonable person has a way of speaking that can aid in 
understanding how a court should interpret words. His or her language is characterised as 
accessible and ordinary; it does not typically contain jargon. This standard of language is 
considered to be basic enough to communicate a variety of concepts between individuals of all 
walks of life;62 characteristic of an idealised speaker of a language community.63 This suggests 
something of frequency of usage; the meaning people typically associate with words used in 
similar circumstances to what a court is investigating.64 It is usually the meaning assigned to 
words by this reasonable person that a court of law supposedly tries to establish and confirm. 
But this idea is not without its problems.65 As Slocum has observed, courts often go beyond 
what an ‘ordinary person’ would be likely to do when confronted with the same text or 
situation, for instance giving grammar and semantics the same critical consideration as a 
presiding officer.66 Also, the language of this ‘idealised interpreter’ is often perceived to be 
more sophisticated than that of the ordinary language user being imagined.67 According to 
Slocum, it would be more accurate to refer to an astute person, someone that has a more 
sophisticated outlook on the way ordinary folk would use language.68 
However, if we cannot fully define who the reasonable person is, then we cannot identify 
the language standard used by him or her with much certainty either. If an ordinary meaning 
can be assigned to a contested word, and if it is accepted that this ordinary meaning would have 
been assigned by an ordinary, reasonable person, then surely this could be tested? If results 
prove that a court’s interpretation of words is the same as that of the so-called ordinary person, 
then its existence can actually be confirmed. However, if the results prove a clear discrepancy 
                                                          
61 According to Braman ibid at 1457, and footnote 11 at 1458), the reasonable person standard should be 
informed by what he calls ‘factualization’ and ‘cultural cognition’. Factualisation evaluates an individual’s 
demographic information, whereas cultural cognition explains how an individual conforms his or her factual 
beliefs to his or her core values and cultural commitments. This approach helps investigators better understand an 
individual’s perceptions and behaviour. See also Moore op cit note 37 at 116–17, and Slocum note 17 above at 
103-104.   
62 My description deviates from that of Summers & Marshall (op cit note 17 at 221), who define an ordinary 
language user as someone who is educated, with a general knowledge, who knows the basics of many different 
topics and who can distinguish between a word’s different senses. To them, this speaker is not a ‘common or 
popular talker’, but it is to me. Moore op cit note 37 at 116–17; Du Plessis op cit note 5 at 109.  
63 Slocum op cit note 17 at 103.  
64 See also Solan op cit note 5 at 53. 
65 Hutton op cit note 6 at 56.  
66 Slocum op cit note 17 at 104.  
67 Ibid at 105.  
68 Ibid at 105–6.  
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between a court’s interpretation and that of a reasonable person, then the concept of an ordinary 
meaning within law is a fallacy.         
The goal of this contribution is exactly that – to gauge whether the public understands words 
in the same way that judges do. The test is a simple one: Participants had to select between two 
options – a court’s interpretation of the particular word’s ordinary meaning, and an alternative 
meaning presented to the court. Participants also needed to define a number of words that were 
previously contested in court, without the aid of resources such as a dictionary. The initial 
hypothesis was that the public would generally choose and define words differently from the 
interpretations that stood up in court, thus proving that ordinary meaning assigned by a 
reasonable person – as described in this study – is different from the ordinary meaning rule that 
exists in legal scholarship and practice. 
Before the results of the experiment can be discussed, an outline of the methodology will be 
provided.     
    
II METHODOLOGY 
(a)  Method 
 
In order to test whether meaning assigned to disputed words in court cases matches the 
understanding of reasonable people who use everyday language, data were collected through a 
survey approach.69 The main goal of the survey was to determine if participants were capable 
of identifying the definition best suited for its legal purpose and whether they were able to 
define selected words unaided. The survey, operated by Google Forms, was kept simple and 
populated with two categories: demographic information and a word test. The survey was 
distributed electronically by means of electronic mail, short message service and a learning 
management system utilised by a South African university. The aim was to reach participants 
from all walks of life; this means people from varying backgrounds who differ, based on levels 
of education, language group and proficiency, and profession. Participation was voluntary, 
anonymous and restricted to people within the borders of South Africa.  
The survey had to be completed electronically, either by computer or smartphone. Once the 
survey was submitted, Google Forms generated statistics for multiple-choice-type questions 
and recorded participants’ responses, where written answers were expected. For the purpose of 
                                                          
69 Ethical clearance to conduct this research was granted by the College of Human Sciences of the University 
of South Africa; reference number 2018-CHS-0110.  
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analysis and owing to time constraints, the responses were capped at 151 responses.70 Owing 
to the small sample size (and its limitations), this contribution should be viewed as a 
preliminary and explorative study only.  
       
(b)  Design 
 
As mentioned above, the survey was divided into two parts: a demographic section and a word 
test. For the demographic information, participants had to provide details such as age, 
occupation, level of education and language. For the language profile, participants had to 
indicate what they considered to be their first language – in this case, ‘first language’ referred 
to the language they used most often and were most comfortable using. This was followed by 
an indication of the participant’s proficiency in South African English. Proficiency levels were 
taken from the Common European Framework of Reference for Languages, which sets a ‘can-
do’ standard for proficiency levels in English.71 It is important to keep in mind that the 
proficiency levels in this survey are self-reported. This specific set of demographic data was 
collected to better understand who the ‘reasonable person’ behind the results was.      
The word test was likewise divided into two parts (Sets A and B) and consisted of ten words 
in total (see table 1 below).72  
Table 1: Summary of selected words 







                                                          
70 The researcher can lock the survey at any given time. When this survey was locked and the numbers tallied, 
the participant total stood at 151. A decision was made not to interfere with the dataset by deleting one participant 
for a more rounded number; instead the data was left intact.    
71 Council of Europe ‘The CEFR Levels’ available at https://www.coe.int/en/web/common-european-
framework-reference-languages/level-descriptions, accessed on 14 March 2019. It is worth noting that the CERF 
functions as a framework only and has been extended to include languages outside of Europe such as Arabic, 
Bahasa and Swahili for instance. Though it is not tailored to the South African context specifically, it is widely 
used by South African institutions that teach English as a foreign or second language. The CERF is better 
recognised around the world than most other literacy levels. However, this does not mean that the framework is 
not flawed. For more information on the CERF, see David Little ‘The Common European Framework of 
Reference for Languages: content, purpose, origin, reception and impact’ (2006) 39 Language Teaching 167. For 
a view on CERF in South Africa, see Charlotte Mbali ‘Appropriate assessment of English language competency 
for South African teachers-in-training’ (2017) 35 Southern African Linguistics and Applied Language Studies 
285.  
72 ‘Road’ in Bell v Road Accident Fund 2007 (6) SA 48 (SCA); ‘export’ in De Beers Marine (Pty) Ltd v CSARS 
2002 (5) SA 136 (SCA); ‘money’ in Feldman v Midgin 2006 (6) SA 12 (SCA); ‘parent’ in Fish Hoek Primary 
School v GW 2010 (2) SA 141 (SCA); ‘invest’ in King v Attorneys Fidelity Fund Board of Control 2010 (4) SA 
185 (SCA); ‘absence’ in Natal Rugby Union v Gould 1999 (1) SA 432 (SCA); ‘value’ in Paola v Jeeva 2004 (1) 
SA 396 (SCA); ‘strike’ in SASRIA Ltd v Slabbert Burger Transport (Pty) Ltd 2008 (5) SA 270 (SCA); ‘crush’ in 
CSARS v Coltrade International CC (54/2015) [2016] ZASCA 53; ‘grab’ in S v Salmans 2006 (1) SACR 333 (C). 






These ten words were selected from South African case law. Initially, a search was conducted 
on the Juta Law Online Publications database for South African law reports. The search term 
‘ordinary meaning’ was used to sort cases. Cases that featured this search term were further 
scrutinised for words that were explicitly interpreted according to the ordinary meaning rule.73 
Though great pains were taken to ensure that jargon or other technical words were not included 
in the test, there were no specific criteria for inclusion. Words were listed on the survey in 
sequence and not all at once.  
Set A consisted of the first five words of the test. Each word in Set A was defined according 
to two definitions, which were very similar. One definition was formulated to reflect the court’s 
interpretation of the disputed word’s ordinary meaning and the other definition reflected the 
interpretation issues addressed by the relevant court. Participants had to choose between these 
two options; they could select only one option. In Set B, participants were given five words 
that they needed to describe using their own words, without the aid of resources such as a 
dictionary. A blank copy of the survey is included at the end of this article (see the appendix).  
 
(c)  Analysis 
 
As in the case of the demographic information, statistics for Set A were generated by Google 
Forms. Because participants simply had to choose between two options, the statistics indicated 
a clear answer. However, because the respondents had to provide text to describe the words in 
Set B, their answers were analysed using the corpus analysis programme,74 AntConc.75 
Responses for each word in Set B were extracted and placed in separate documents. The 
documents were converted to plain text format (txt) and then uploaded to AntConc respectively 
as sub-corpora. In order to make inferences, the wordlist, concordance and n-gram tools were 
utilised to study these words in context. Keyword lists and the collocate tool were not used. 
                                                          
73 Some presiding officers used slightly more specific qualifications, such as ‘ordinary grammatical meaning’ 
(King), ‘generally accepted meaning’ (Coltrade International), ‘ordinary dictionary meaning’ (SASRIA), ‘literal 
ordinary meaning’ (Fish Hoek Primary), and ‘ordinary commercial meaning’ (De Beers Marine)’.  
74 A corpus analysis toolkit is a variety of software tools that allows researchers to study everyday speech and 
writing by conducting various word searches on a selected text corpus. Common tools include a concordancer, 
wordlists, parts-of-speech taggers, annotators, collocations, parsers, n-grams and keyword lists. By identifying 
frequency and patterns, we can draw important conclusions about speakers’ typical (ordinary) language use.   
75 Laurence Anthony AntConc Computer Software version 342 (2014).  
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First, a wordlist was generated. Words were sorted by frequency and the most frequent 
nouns, verbs and adjectives were recorded. Words had to occur at least 4 times within each 
sub-corpus to be considered. Thereafter, the identified lexical items were searched in the 
concordancer of AntConc. Searches in the concordance tool were done using a wildcard for 
each term in order to study the lexeme;76 their occurrences were recorded and their contexts 
scrutinised for clarity, ambiguity and vagueness. Lastly, a search was done on each sub-corpus, 
using the cluster tool. When n-grams were studied, frequency was set at 3 (min) and the size 
of n-grams were set between 3 (min) and 5 (max). When clusters were sorted by word, the 
frequency was set at 3 (min) and the size was set between 1 (min) and 5 (max) and sorted on 
the left of the search term. These parameters delivered the most sensible results within sub-
corpora this small.    
The statistical results for Set A (taken from Google Forms), together with the results of Set 
B (from the AntConc corpus analysis), were then compared with the information gathered from 
the iWeb corpus77 and the meanings assigned to these words by the respective courts. The 
words were then discussed, based on the different sets of results.  
iWeb was employed because it is large, contains many corpus analysis tools that simplify 
analyses and has a user-friendly interface. It was released in 2018 and consists of 14 billion 
words taken from 22 million web pages. The corpus is mostly representative of English used 
in the USA, Canada, the UK, Ireland, Australia and New Zealand.78 Not only is iWeb very 
different to most corpora, but it is unique in what the architecture offers users. When searches 
are based on the top 60 000 words in the corpus (as was the case for this study), each word’s 
definition,79 parts of speech, synonyms and antonyms (where available), related topics 
                                                          
76 A wildcard is a setting that helps the concordance user to search for different forms of the same word (the 
lexeme) simultaneously. For instance, using the search term ‘put*’ will deliver results for ‘put’, ‘puts’ and 
‘putting’.   
77 Brigham Young University (BYU) ‘iWeb’ available at https://corpus.byu.edu/iweb/, accessed on 24 January 
2020.  
78 According to the corpus overview, iWeb does not include texts from Nigeria, Singapore or India. Evidently, 
South Africa is also excluded. However, some results for the search terms ‘punjabi’ and ‘zulu’ are derived from 
Indian and South African websites respectively, that do not use the .za or .in domain indicators. This means that 
results are not based solely on web pages from the countries listed but include web pages from South Africa. 
Ideally, a South African English (SAE) corpus should be consulted; however, the existing SAE corpus is limited 
in its representation of English in South Africa and it is not publically accessible. This motivates researchers to 
use other available corpora. iWeb forms part of the BYU corpus stable, which offers the largest collection of 
words in the English language and the most widely-used corpora at present. For more information on the SAE 
corpus and subsequent developments, see amongst others Leela Pienaar and Vivian de Klerk ‘Towards a corpus 
of South African English: Corralling the sub-varieties’ (2009) 19 Lexikos 353, and Bertus van Rooy ‘Corpus 
linguistic work on Black South African English’ (2013) 29 English Today 10.   
79 The definitions provided by iWeb are based on other dictionary websites and are therefore not related to its 
corpus data. However, everything else (parts of speech, topics, clusters, collocates, etc) is derived from iWeb’s 
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(prototype based) as well as collocates and clusters are provided in a user-friendly results 
page.80 This results page looks like a virtual dictionary though it remains a corpus based text. 
Apart from the usual corpus features like concordance lines and frequency information, users 
can look up a word’s pronunciation and translation, and consult images and videos related to 
that word or concept.81 iWeb has revolutionised corpus usage and makes it ideal for semantic 
interpretation tasks like statutory interpretation, especially because it can be read like an 
interactive dictionary.  
Using corpora this big (instead of traditional dictionaries) enables researchers to get a better 
idea of the words and phrases used by everyday speakers.82 Such corpora often derive their 
data from naturally occurring language samples and they regularly help to fill gaps left by 
dictionaries.83 Since a corpus allows users to study language in use, it can provide a better view 
of context because words can be examined together with their co-occurring words.84 Moreover, 
based on high frequency, a corpus can provide clues to prototypicality better than a standard 
dictionary can.85 As cited literature indicate, corpora are ideal for ordinary meaning 
investigations. This study relied on (and scrutinised) the following features for its 
interpretations: definitions, word relations, collocates, clusters, topics and its concordance 




Even though this was a preliminary investigation, its ambitions were constrained by its 
limitations. Firstly, the study was limited to willing participants. This fact, together with access 
                                                          
corpus. This was confirmed by iWeb’s creator, Mark Davies, in personal correspondence dated 28 February 2020. 
To ensure the necessary rigour, definitions taken from Oxford’s online dictionary were added to the analysis. 
80 For a better overview of iWeb’s many functions and features, please consult its overview document: 
Brigham Young University ‘The iWeb corpus’ available at https://corpus.byu.edu/iweb/help/iweb_overview.pdf, 
accessed on 23 January 2020. 
81 Brigham Young University op cit note 78.  
82 Stefan Th Gries & Brian G Slocum ‘Ordinary meaning and corpus linguistics’ (2018) 2017 Brigham Young 
University Law Review 1417; John D Ramer ‘Corpus linguistics: Misfire or more ammo for the ordinary-meaning 
canon’ (2017) 116 Michigan Law Review 303; Lawrence M Solan & Tammy Gales ‘Corpus linguistics as a tool 
in legal interpretation’ (2018) 2017 Brigham Young University Law Review 1311; Solan & Gales op cit note 44; 
Lee & Mouritsen op cit note 41. Not everyone is positive about the use of corpora in legal interpretation. See the 
following for an alternative view: Carissa Byrne Hessick ‘Corpus linguistics and the criminal law’ (2018) 2017 
Brigham Young University Law Review 1503.   
83 Lauren Simpson ‘#OrdinaryMeaning: Using Twitter as a corpus in statutory analysis’ (2018) 2017 Brigham 
Young University Law Review 487 at 492–3. This is specifically true for iWeb. Because it is web-based, users 
have access to ordinary language users’ language output. It is even possible to be redirected from within the corpus 
to video that feature the word in spoken context, see Brigham Young University op cit note 78.  
84 Gries & Slocum op cit note 83 at 1441. 
85 Ibid. 
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to the survey through computers and smartphones, limited the number of potential participants. 
The latter severely compromised participation by individuals with lower income and literacy 
profiles, which had a visible impact on the data through absence.  
Secondly, the medium of English used to conduct the research may have had an impact on 
the decision to participate, as well as on the answers provided by those participants who did 
not have as good a command of the language as they thought they had. This relates specifically 
to participants’ proficiency levels. Participants would need a B1 or B2 to understand and 
complete the survey; whereas distinguishing between the words in Set A, probably requires a 
much higher linguistic capability than the B level enables. Paper-based copies and translations 
of the survey could have been distributed to financially vulnerable communities and individuals 
with limited English proficiency in order to gain a more representative view, but this approach 
was constrained by the study’s financial and time resources. Furthermore, South African courts 
use English as the lingua franca, which makes a fair translation of the words used in court cases 
challenging. 
A third limitation is the lack of significant South African English representation in iWeb, 
which means that interpretations based on this corpus does not account for any country and 
culture specific differences in meaning. Typical South African nuances therefore remain 
absent. A case in point could be the word ‘parent’ or ‘family’, which might be interpreted very 
differently according to diverse cultural practices.  
A fourth concern relates to the demographic profile of participants. As will be seen from the 
data, the profile of participants is skewed and does not reflect the South African population in 
terms of representation. This is noteworthy, because conclusions drawn from the data must be 
done with caution and cannot be extrapolated to South Africans in general.    
       
(e) Accountability and confirmation bias 
 
It is important to reflect on accountability and the influence of confirmation bias on the analysis 
and conclusions to follow. Without considering these two aspects, it might seem as if the results 
indicate no more than that the judicial interpretation accords with the lexical corpus and the 
corpus reflects ‘ordinary’ usage. What assumptions are at play here and how do they impact 
the conclusion?  
 McEnery and Hardie warns that if you approach a corpus with a specific theory in mind, it 
can be easy to “unintentionally focus on and pull out only the examples from the corpus that 
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support the theory”.86 This is referred to as confirmation bias. The danger in this approach is 
that you can never prove the theory to be false.87 To prevent this, McEnery and Hardie advise 
to use the entire corpus – and all the relevant evidence that emerge from the analysis – on which 
the hypothesis is based.88 Ideally, a researcher should avoid conscious or motivated selection 
of data to fit the hypothesis.89 As will be seen, this is not the case for the present study.  
 Because iWeb is sourced through the world wide web, it is termed as a web corpus. Apart 
from being generally very large, it has the potential to continue growing.90 It will contain 
mostly written text, both edited and unedited and the data are usually not divided by genre. The 
survey corpus is better described as an opportunistic corpus. This kind of corpus does not 
pretend to adhere to a rigorous sampling frame and it does not attempt to deal with issues of 
skew; instead, this corpus “represents nothing more nor less than the data that it was possible 
to gather for a specific task”.91 Therefore, no claims are made that the data presented here are 
robust. The results are exploratory and allow the researcher to speculate, which in turn 
(hopefully) leads to more prodding and investigation. The fact that the results did not confirm 
the hypothesis, should give some indication that the instruments used were not purposefully 
manipulated.  
The data were collected with the aim to test a hypothesis. To avoid confirmation bias and to 
prevent opportunistic selection, both corpora were used in their entirety and no active sampling 
was done. This rings true for the selection of court cases and the participants of the survey as 
well. As already indicated, the cases were selected as objectively as possible and the 
participation was anonymous. 
Nevertheless, it is nearly impossible to achieve perfect balance and representativeness in 
corpus linguistic research of this kind,92 therefore residual research bias and influence is 
acknowledged. Even if the methods used are reasonably objective (which may be arguable by 
some), the study remains text based and relies on interpretation; all inferences are foremost 
those of the researcher. Conclusions are therefore drawn with care.            
 
 
                                                          
86 Tony McEnery & Andrew Hardie Corpus Linguistics. Method, Theory and Practice (2011) 14.  
87 Ibid. 
88 Ibid at 15. 
89 Ibid.  
90 Ibid at 7. 
91 Ibid at 11. 
92 Ibid at 10. 
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III  RESULTS  
 
In this section, the data from the questionnaire are provided and discussed in relation to the 
issues addressed in the problem statement. 
 
(a)  Demographic data 
 
Demographic data give some indication of who the participants were and enable the researcher 
and readers to infer to what extent these persons were ‘reasonable’ and ‘ordinary’. They also 
assist in determining the limitations of the study and provide the researcher with a background 
against which the results of the word test should be interpreted (see table 2 for a summary). 
Table 2: Summary of demographic data (n 151) 
Age  18-30 31-50 51-70 >70      















    











   
































C1 C2 B1 B2 A1 A2    
46% 18% 11% 17% 3% 5%    
 
Participants in this survey had to choose between four age categories: 18 to 30 years; 31 to 
50 years; 51 to 70 years; and older than 70 years. Thirty-six per cent of participants fell within 
the first category and 49 per cent were between the ages of 31 and 50. Eleven per cent were 
older than 50, and only four per cent were older than 70. With regard to their level of schooling, 
two per cent did not finish school and 20 per cent had only a school-leaving certificate. Almost 
11 per cent of participants had received post-school training without any kind of accreditation 
and another 12 per cent had received post-school training with official documentation. Fifty-
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four per cent of participants held a qualification from a tertiary institution; 13 per cent had a 
tertiary diploma; 17 per cent had a bachelor’s degree; and 25 per cent were already in 
possession of a postgraduate qualification. Participants indicated different forms of occupation: 
at 29 per cent, the majority of participants worked in the education sector; seven per cent 
worked in business; six per cent worked in legal fields; nine per cent were in IT; another eleven 
per cent indicated that they were students; and 12 per cent chose the ‘Other’ category.  
The language profile of participants revealed that 52 per cent considered themselves 
speakers of Afrikaans and 27 per cent indicated English as their first language.93 A further 
seven per cent spoke isiZulu, whereas Setswana and isiXhosa were both represented by three 
per cent of participants. Sesotho sa Lebowa came in at two per cent, followed by Tshivenda 
with one per cent and Sesotho with less than one percent. Speakers of Xitsonga and isiNdebele 
were not reflected in the data. Four per cent of the participants indicated that they spoke a non-
South African language (but did not specify). Considering that South Africans use English (and 
different vernaculars thereof) as the lingua franca to navigate daily life and that the majority of 
participants had tertiary schooling of some kind, it was not surprising that 46 per cent indicated 
that they spoke English at C2 level. A further 18 per cent placed themselves at C1 level and 17 
per cent at B2 level. Eleven per cent considered themselves to be at B1 level and about eight 
per cent indicated that they had a poor level of proficiency in English (three per cent at A1 and 
five per cent at A2). Of course, this is a perceived level of proficiency and does not signify a 
true reflection of language capability. Research by Carstens, Maes and Gangla-Birir pointed 
out that people often read at a lower level than what they believe they do.94  
The demographic data show that the majority of participants were educated, worked in a 
professional setting and were sufficiently proficient in South African English to communicate 
at a commonsense language level and to understand basic concepts. In other words, the 
                                                          
93 At this point, the demographic profile of participants already indicates an obvious discrepancy with 
population statistics. According to the South African census of 2011, about thirteen per cent of South Africans 
speak Afrikaans, more than nine per cent speak English, sixteen per cent speak isiXhosa and more than twenty-
two per cent are isiZulu speaking. Approximately twelve per cent have some kind of post-school education and 
three per cent have a qualification from a university. This is remarkably different from the demographic profile 
of the present study. Inferences should be made with caution and within context. See Statistics South Africa 
‘Census 2011 Key Results’ available at 
http://www.statssa.gov.za/census/census_2011/census_products/Census_2011_Key_results.pdf, accessed on 16 
May 2019. 
94 Adelia Carstens, Alfons Maes & Lilian Gangla-Birir ‘Understanding visuals in HIV/AIDS education in 
South Africa: Differences between literate and low-literate audiences’ (2006) 5 African Journal of Aids Research 
1. However, due to the cognitive load of the survey, participants would have to manage a proficiency level of B2 
and higher in order to complete the survey meaningfully. Because participants had to report their perceived 
proficiency levels, it is very likely that those who indicated A1 and A2 were in fact more proficient than they 
thought.  
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participants were not representative of the entire country, especially not of the most vulnerable 
groups within South Africa, which often fall prey to the legal system because of linguistic, 
educational and financial barriers. However, does representation equate ‘ordinary’ and 
‘reasonable’? Because participants were not representative of South Africa in general, they 
might also not be considered ‘ordinary’ by some. The same applies to the notion of 
reasonability: when Braman as well as Summers and Marshall’s concepts of ‘reasonable’ are 
considered, then participants in this study qualify.95 Once more, participants in the present 
study should rather be described as ‘astute’ than ‘reasonable’ and ‘ordinary’.96  
 
(b)  Results of Set A 
 
For the first five words of the word test, participants had to choose between two definitions. 
The definitions were constructed based on the semantic issue that the relevant court had to 
clarify. One definition was constructed to reflect an ‘ordinary meaning’, while the other 
reflected the issue before the court. What follows are the facts of each case, related data from 
the iWeb corpus and the results from the survey.97   
In the case of Fish Hoek Primary, the court had to study the word ‘parent’, as set out in s 
40(1) of the South African Schools Act 84 of 1996.98 As Ponnan JA explained, the court had 
to decide whether ‘parent’ had to be given a broader definition, to include non-custodians, or a 
more restrictive denotation.99 In this instance, the court found the definition of ‘parent’ in s 
40(1) of the Act to be deliberately broad in order to include non-custodians as well, especially 
when it comes to financial responsibilities such as debt owed to schools.100 This effectively 
means that a ‘parent’ is someone who is actively involved in a child’s life, as well as someone 
who is related to that child only biologically.  
                                                          
95 Braman op cit note 61, and Summers & Marshall op cit note 17 at 61–62.  
96 Slocum op cite note 17 at 105–6.  
97 Evidently, all inferences made from the data which are not explicitly related to a presiding judge or court of 
law are my own. 
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iWeb101 defines a ‘parent’ as a mother or father, or as someone who has adopted a child. 
The Oxford dictionary102 describes ‘parent’ as the progenitor of a child, but extends the 
definition to someone who has parental responsibilities toward a child (like a stepfather or 
adoptive mother). The relationship between parent and child is further described by adjectives 
such as ‘legal’, ‘adoptive’, ‘concerned’ and ‘custodial’. Compound and possessive nouns, such 
as ‘single parent’, ‘teen parents’, ‘school parents’ ‘child’s parents’ and ‘parent’s house’, 
provide a similar view of a custodial relationship between child and guardian. However, the 
corpus includes the adjective ‘biological’ and the compound noun ‘birth parent’. Although 
these words are not restricted to non-custodians, they contribute to a broadening of the ordinary 
meaning of ‘parent’ to suggest the inclusion of non-custodial individuals.   
Eighty-seven per cent of participants said a parent is a biological or adoptive father/mother, 
or a legal guardian, who is an active participant in the child’s life, while 13 per cent agreed that 
a parent could be either an active participant in the child’s life or someone with no contact or 
knowledge of that child. While iWeb does allow for a broadening of the ordinary meaning, the 
participants viewed ‘parent’ in a restrictive sense, which differs from the court’s interpretation. 
In the Paolo case, the word ‘value’ was contested in terms of s 7(1)(b)(ii)(aa)(ccc) of the 
National Building Regulations and Building Standards Act 103 of 1977 in relation to property. 
The court had to clarify whether the meaning of ‘value’ could go beyond a property’s financial 
worth to include an owner’s well-being and emotional comfort, as a result of a property’s fine 
view.103 The appellant argued that his property’s value would diminish once the respondents’ 
newly built property had obscured his ‘unsurpassed view’, which had been unobstructed for 
about twenty years.104 Farlam JA concluded that the ordinary meaning of ‘value’ is limited to 
its commercial sense, namely market value.105  
iWeb results106 point in the same direction. ‘Value’ is interpreted as ‘market value’ in 
relation to free-standing property. It is seen as the amount (of money, goods or services) 
considered to be a fair equivalent for something else; a numerical quantity measured, assigned 
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or computed. The Oxford dictionary107 corresponds, but includes estimations of worth and 
usefulness. The relationship between ‘value’ and ‘property’ is further confirmed by nouns 
frequently associated with the contested word, such as ‘money’, ‘market’, ‘property’, ‘asset’ 
and ‘core’. Value, as a quantifiable measurement, and its association with tangible goods is 
also visible in compound nouns such as ‘value ratio’, ‘value stocks’, ‘face value’, ‘default 
value’, ‘cash value’, ‘property value’, ‘resale value’ and ‘home value’.  
Eighty-one per cent of participants agreed with the definition indicating financial worth, 
while 19 per cent thought that ‘value’ includes an owner’s well-being and emotional comfort. 
This is a clear indication that the majority understood the word in the same way as the 
applicable court.   
The third word tested in the survey was ‘strike’. The respondent in the SASRIA case, who 
was a transport-fleet operator, suffered severe damages when one of its trucks was set alight 
during a strike.108 The fleet was insured by the appellant against damages caused by strikes, 
riots or public disorder.109 The court had to determine whether ‘strike’ had the same meaning 
as ‘riot’ and ‘public disorder’; in addition, the court had to consider to what extent the meaning 
of ‘strike’ could/should contain violence as a criterion.110 Ultimately, the court decided that 
‘strike’ should be given its ordinary meaning (to stop working in order to gain a concession 
from an employer)111 and that the damage to the truck had to be dealt with as a peril listed in 
the insurance policy.112  
Not surprisingly, iWeb113 defines ‘strike’ as a group’s refusal to work in protest against low 
pay or bad working conditions. According to the Oxford dictionary,114 ‘strike’ means to stop 
working in order to obtain ‘some concession from the employer’. Synonyms (‘industrial 
action’, ‘slowdown’, ‘walkout’), adjectives (‘general’, ‘joint’, ‘unarmed’) and compound 
nouns (‘strike action’, ‘hunger strike’) confirm that strike action is traditionally non-violent.    
Similarly, 71 per cent of the survey participants chose the definition indicating ‘strike’ as a 
group’s refusal to work in protest against low pay or bad working conditions. In contrast, 29 
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per cent considered violence and public disturbance as an integral part of strike action. Even 
though the majority of respondents viewed strike action as non-violent, 29 per cent is a 
reasonably high percentage for an opposing interpretation. This interpretation could be linked 
to an increase in violence during industrial action in South Africa.115 
In the Coltrade International case,116 the Supreme Court of Appeal had to interpret the word 
‘crush’ as it related to the question of which tariff subheading applied to coconut milk, coconut 
cream and coconut powder, as set out in s 47(1) of the Customs and Excise Act 91 of 1964, in 
accordance with sched 1 of the Act. For about seven years, Coltrade International CC had their 
imported coconut products cleared under one tariff subheading (TH2008.19), but as of 2012, 
the South African revenue authority classified the imported products under a new subheading 
(TH2106.90.90).117 To determine whether the correct classification was issued, the court had 
to look at the way in which the imported products were described and processed.118 To fall 
under subheading TH2008.19, the product had to be whole, in pieces or crushed. For the 
Commissioner of the South African Revenue Service, the final product was processed to such 
an extent that it could no longer be viewed as whole, in pieces or crushed, resulting in an 
entirely different product altogether.119 Consequently, the word ‘crush’ was at the core of the 
dispute. However, the court finally decided to apply the ordinary meaning of ‘crush’, namely 
to break into smaller pieces or to reduce to pulp or powder.120  
iWeb121 describes the verb ‘crush’ as the compressing of an item out of its natural shape or 
condition. The Oxford dictionary122 adds that crushing is a violent act that breaks, bruises and 
brays into smaller pieces (especially ore, quartz, seeds, etc.). The transformation from one 
format to another is visible in synonyms such as ‘cream’, ‘squeeze’, ‘pound’ and ‘mash’, as 
well as in related verbs such as ‘chew’, ‘grind’, ‘extract’ and ‘chop’. Even the adverbs ‘lightly’ 
and ‘finely’ imply the force of crushing and the texture and consistency of the end result. The 
implication is that an item no longer retains its original shape. Yet, nothing in these words 
imply that the crushed item can no longer be classified within its main category. For instance, 
a crushed orange might be reduced to juice, but its new format is still related to an orange.       
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Sixty-one per cent of participants felt that ‘crush’ means an object is broken into smaller 
pieces, powder or liquid by applying force in the form of pressing or squeezing. Thirty-nine 
per cent thought that an object is changed into something else entirely by applying force in the 
form of pressing or squeezing. Although the gap between the results was considerably smaller 
than in the case of the other words, the majority’s understanding of the word ‘crush’ still 
corresponded with the court’s interpretation and that of the iWeb corpus data.   
The last word to be tested in Set A was ‘grab’. In Salmans, Foxcroft J had to determine 
whether, among other things, the appellant was correctly convicted of robbery instead of theft, 
as put forth by his counsel.123 Of importance was the question as to what extent the word ‘grab’ 
connotes violence or force.124 The court concluded that the grabbing of a cellphone from the 
victim’s hand qualified as an act of violence, implying that ‘grab’ connotes violence or force.125 
iWeb126 defines ‘grab’ as taking hold of something, seizing quickly, snatching, restraining 
or even stopping motion. In addition, the Oxford dictionary127 explicitly mentions 
unscrupulous appropriation to oneself. These definitions imply physical contact, which 
contrasts with acts of theft, where contact is limited and veiled. Synonyms validate the physical 
contact and implied force, for instance ‘clutch’, ‘grasp’, ‘grip’ and ‘remove’. In addition, 
violence is clearly present in the adverbs ‘forcefully’ and ‘tightly’ that collocate frequently 
with the word ‘grab’.   
Seventy-nine per cent of participants said that ‘grab’ means an object is taken with some 
force and physical contact, whereas 21 per cent said the word implies little or no contact and 
indicates an activity that goes unnoticed by the owner of the object taken. 
 
(c)  Results of Set B 
 
As explained in the methodology section, the corpus analysis program, AntConc, was used to 
analyse respondents’ written results in order to find commonalities by means of frequency and 
clustering. Each of the words in Set B will be discussed separately below. 
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In the De Beers Marine case,128 the court had to decide what the word ‘export’ meant in the 
context of s 20(4)(d) of the Customs and Excise Act 91 of 1964.129 Was its meaning restricted 
to ‘taking out of South Africa’, or did it include ‘importing into another country’? The unusual 
scenario brought before the court dealt with the transportation of bunker fuel used during 
diamond mining operations off the Namibian coast.130 Fuel is transported from Cape Town to 
bunkers off the Namibian coast, stationary over the South African continental shelf (and 
therefore considered part of the Republic of South Africa). The specialised mining vessels are 
refuelled from these bunkers to continue their operations in Namibian waters. Is the fuel being 
taken out of South Africa and imported into another country (Namibia), or does the use of fuel 
in this context qualify as ‘home consumption’? The court understood the ordinary meaning of 
‘export’ to denote ‘carrying away’ or to ‘remove’.131 A narrower commercial meaning was also 
considered by the court and extends to transport ‘from one country to another in the course of 
trade’.132  
iWeb133 defines ‘export’ as the selling or transferring of something abroad, as well as the 
spreading of something to another part of the world. The Oxford dictionary134 is more precise 
when it refers to the sending out of commodities from one country to another. Its synonyms 
are related to the logistics of exporting, for instance ‘distribute’, ‘ship’, ‘freight’, ‘transfer’ and 
‘sell abroad’. The idea of movement from one place to another is similarly present in the 
prepositions ‘to’ and ‘from’, which collocate frequently with ‘export’ in this corpus. Its 
association with distribution is further expressed by its adverbs, for example ‘overseas’, 
‘abroad’, ‘globally’, ‘worldwide’ and even ‘illegally’.   
Respondents in this survey did not struggle to explain what they understood the word to 
mean. From 1 522 tokens, the results revealed that ‘export’ was seen by participants as the 
moving of items from one country to another for financial gain. Lexical items that stand out 
include ‘sending’ (50 occurrences),135 ‘selling’, ‘moving’, ‘taking’, ‘transport’ and ‘trade’. 
When doing an n-gram search on the word ‘to’, phrases ‘to another country’, ‘one country to 
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another’ and ‘to move goods’ occurred frequently as well. Respondents’ understanding of the 
word ‘export’ clearly matches that of the court and the iWeb corpus. In other words, one can 
safely conclude that ‘export’ denotes the movement of goods or services across borders.136 
In the Feldman case,137 the court had to decide if the word ‘money’, as set out in s 46 of the 
Administration of Estates Act 66 of 1965, included cheques or if it applied only to cash/notes 
and coins. The contested issue relates to the duties of an executor, who must open a bank 
account and pay the relevant money of an estate into that account.138 In Feldman, there was no 
sign of any money being deposited into the relevant account, but there were several cheques 
that were never collected and subsequently became stale.139 The court a quo decided that 
‘money’ included cheques, because the legislator would otherwise have used the word 
‘cash’.140 The court of appeal disagreed. 
‘Money’ is defined in iWeb141 as the official currency issued by a government or national 
bank as a common medium of exchange. Its synonyms are indicated as ‘cash’, ‘change’, 
‘currency’, ‘coinage’, ‘stock’, ‘income’ and ‘earnings’. Frequent adjectives such as ‘extra’, 
‘earned’, ‘payable’, ‘wasted’ and ‘borrowed’ might imply the use of cash instead of cheques; 
however, they refer to the use of cheques in certain contexts as well (payable by cheque, this 
cheque is wasted, I earned my cheque). With regard to compound nouns, the concept of cash 
or money in e-format once again comes to the fore. Consider ‘money laundering’, ‘money 
problems’, ‘prize money’, ‘pocket money’, ‘insurance money’ and ‘money transfers’.  
Interestingly, iWeb and the Oxford dictionary142 both define ‘cheque’ as a written order 
directing a bank to pay money. Verbs associated with ‘cheque’ include ‘write’, ‘accept’, 
‘receive’ and ‘present’. This is noticeably different from how ‘money’ is denoted. This 
discrepancy becomes more visible when collocations such as ‘personal cheque’, ‘bank cheque’, 
‘certified cheque’ and ‘monthly cheque’ are considered. The cluster ‘cash or cheque’ also 
suggests that a cheque is a different aspect of money as opposed to paper or coinage. That being 
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said, the Oxford dictionary143 extends the definition of ‘money’ to include any record (written, 
printed, electronic) that confirms its monetary values and which can in turn be exchanged for 
notes or coins (and their e-formats). Its reference to any written, printed or electronic record as 
an acceptable object of exchange includes cheques.     
By means of 1 418 tokens, respondents described ‘money’ in terms of instrumentality: we 
use money to buy things or to pay for items and services. It is also something that can be 
exchanged. Additionally, ‘money’ was defined in terms of what it was, namely coins, notes, 
paper and cash. More importantly, none of the respondents mentioned the word ‘cheque’.144 
Here, too, participants’ understanding of what money is coincides with the relevant court’s 
ordinary meaning of the contested word and that of the iWeb corpus.  
In the Bell case,145 the court had to interpret a number of words, among them ‘flatbed 
transporter’, ‘motor vehicle’ and ‘road’. One of the court’s main considerations was to 
determine whether a flatbed transporter qualified as a motor vehicle. It was further argued that 
the flatbed transporter in question was designed for use on an airport road specifically. This led 
the court to question if a motor vehicle must then also be designed for use on a public road. 
The court held that the word ‘road’ should be interpreted according to its ordinary meaning and 
not be extended to include specifications such as ‘public’, ‘private’ or ‘airport’.146 In referring 
to Chauke v Santam Ltd 1997 (1) SA 178 (A), the court denoted the ordinary meaning of  ‘road’ 
as ‘a line of communication, especially a specially prepared track between places for use by 
pedestrians, riders and vehicles’.147  
The word ‘road’ is defined in iWeb148 as an open way for travel or transportation. The 
Oxford dictionary149 also describes ‘road’ as a way wide enough for various vehicles to pass. 
This way usually has a prepared surface. The corpus adds that a road is generally public and 
provides synonyms such as ‘street’, ‘path’, ‘highway’, ‘motorway’ and ‘thoroughfare’. 
Adjectives give some indication of the conditions of a road, for example ‘paved’, ‘busy’, 
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‘narrow’, ‘rough’, ‘rural’, ‘winding’ and ‘quiet’. The corpus clearly distinguishes between 
different kinds of road, which entail different uses. For example, a highway and a path are used 
differently and under varying circumstances; speed limits may be different for each. Different 
uses may likewise imply that some vehicles are not meant for certain types of road. This 
distinction is further visible in compound nouns such as ‘dirt road’, ‘gravel road’, ‘country 
road’, ‘mountain road’, ‘service road’ and ‘toll road’. However, when defining ‘road’ as 
‘generally public’, the word ‘generally’ suggests that the definition is not absolutely restrictive.    
Reflecting a token count of 1 468, the survey results described ‘road’ in terms of its 
construction (tar, paved, gravel) and its purpose (driving, travel, journey, transport, commute). 
The respondents also defined ‘road’ as a ‘path’ (47 occurrences) and a ‘surface’ (25 
occurrences) made for travelling by vehicle or on foot. It is seen as a route between two 
destinations, connecting one place with another. The only distinction (in terms of type) 
reflected in the results was that of ‘public’, which occurred once. Participants’ idea of a road 
was similar to that held by the court and the iWeb corpus.  
In Natal Rugby Union,150 the court dealt with the word ‘absence’ and how it related to the 
election of a new union president. The election of 3 March 1995 saw Mr Parkinson appointed 
as the new president, but this election was soon called into question. Subsequently, a re-election 
was held in which Mr Parkinson was once more elected president of the rugby union. Owing 
to the conflict of interest, Mr Parkinson excused himself from the meeting at which the re-
election was held.151 Consequently, Mr Parkinson’s absence was considered by some as a 
contravention of the union’s constitution and reason for disqualification. Clause 15 of the 
union’s constitution addresses the disqualification of council members and stipulates that a 
president, deputy president or any vice-presidents may not absent themselves more than three 
times from meetings without leave of absence. This behaviour could lead to disqualification.152 
However, the court of appeal indicated that the use of ‘absence’ in clause 13 of the constitution 
applied to the case at hand and had to be given its ordinary meaning, that is, the lack of being 
physically present.153 The court dismissed the notion that the word ‘absence’ can be extended 
to include legal disqualification.154   
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iWeb155 defines the noun ‘absence’ as a failure to be present, and the Oxford dictionary156 
defines it as being away from a place or the company of people. Its synonyms ‘nonappearance’ 
and ‘nonexistence’ and its adjective ‘excused’ express a similar meaning. Clusters such as 
‘leave of absence’, ‘absence from work’, ‘absence of any evidence’ and ‘absence makes the 
heart grow fonder’ all imply a lack of physical presence.   
The same idea can be inferred from the 1 073 token corpus. Lexemes such as ‘presence’, 
‘physical’ and ‘missing’ occur frequently enough to be noticeable. When examining clusters 
containing the word ‘not’, the lack of physicality becomes very apparent. Sixteen clusters 
express this idea, for instance: ‘not being present’, ‘not being there’, ‘not being available’, ‘not 
being around’, ‘not attending’ and ‘not showing’. Participants’ understanding of ‘absence’ as 
being not physically present supported the meaning allocated by the court, as well as that 
recorded in iWeb.  
The last word in Set B was ‘invest’. A court heard a case in which more than R33 000 000 
was handed to a law firm in Port Elizabeth for investment in accordance with s 47(1)(g) of the 
Attorneys Act 53 of 1979. The money was subsequently misappropriated, resulting in losses 
for all investors.157 Being undefined in the Act, the presiding officer in King confirmed the 
meaning of ‘invest’ as the placing of money into a financial scheme (or shares, or property) to 
increase its value.158  
According to the Oxford dictionary159 one puts money into assets in order to earn income 
or profit over time. The concept of ‘financial gain’ is present in iWeb’s classification of ‘invest’ 
as well.160 Clusters that occur frequently, namely ‘invest in the company’, ‘invest in real estate’, 
‘invest in stock’ and ‘will continue to invest’, clearly confirm this court’s view of the word. 
Profiting is further expressed through synonyms such as ‘capitalise’, ‘advance’ and ‘enable’, 
as well as through adverbs such as ‘heavily’, ‘wisely’, ‘actively’ and ‘continually’. 
Undoubtedly, investment is seen within this corpus as putting money into a different entity 
with the expectation that the money will increase within a given period.    
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The 1 880 tokens clearly indicate that investment is about ‘money’ (102 occurrences) that 
is placed (‘put’ 60 occurrences) into accounts, property, schemes and shares in order to make 
more money. Words expressing an increase of the investment are ‘grow’, ‘gain’, ‘more’, 
‘profit’, ‘return’, ‘interest’ and ‘value’. This is confirmed by studying n-gram tokens, which 
include phrases like ‘put your money in something’, ‘put money away’ and ‘in order for it to 
grow’.161 The presence of the lexemes ‘expect’ and ‘hope’ adds to the outcome envisioned by 
investors, but also reveals something about the uncertainty of investment.  
           
IV   DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
 
It is important to keep in mind that the sample size of this study was small and the demographics 
of the participants were not representative of the entire South African population. For this 
reason, we need to be cautious in making any definitive conclusions. Any inferences are true 
for this study alone. Nevertheless, the results do give some indication of how an astute person162 
in South Africa interprets ordinary words that are disputed in court cases.  
Considering that the hypothesis was that the public would differ from legal counsel and 
presiding officers in its interpretation of words, and that this would prove the fallacious nature 
of the ordinary meaning rule, it is surprising that the results did just the opposite. The results 
from both Sets A and B indicate correspondence between the survey results, the iWeb corpus 
data and the respective courts’ interpretation of the contested words. Even in the case of 
‘parent’ (Set A), where the court’s decision favoured a broader definition, the interpretation by 
the majority of survey participants coincided with the ordinary meaning assigned by a court 
and the data from iWeb.  
None of the results in Set A were unanimous or exceeded a 90 per cent selection, and none 
of the data generated in Set B indicated unanimous agreement between participants in the way 
they described the given words. This suggests that people conceptualise words differently for 
a number of reasons, implying that disagreement will usually take place. This was clear in the 
minor differences in interpretation in the results of the word ‘crush’: the fact that nearly 40 per 
cent chose the alternative definition is indicative of the vagueness and uncertainty underlying 
the broader concept of crushing, especially concerning the transformation of an item from one 
form to another and its subsequent classification. 
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It is worth mentioning that participants’ responses could be influenced by an array of factors 
such as culture, religion and other personal beliefs and experiences. For instance, the way 
multicultural South Africa understands the concept ‘family’ can lead to significant differences 
in the definition of a word like ‘parent’. Not only does this once again stress why the concept 
of ‘ordinary meaning’ is so contentious, but it also begs for a more comprehensive and 
representative dataset to determine (1) whether societal differences really are noteworthy; and 
(2) whether the law can incorporate meaning constructed by the people and not by the 
establishment. 
Nevertheless, based on the interpretive capabilities of astute persons in this study, there is 
an argument to be made in favour of the existence of ordinary meaning as understood in its 
legal context. Participants did not know from which cases the contested words were taken and, 
therefore, had no prior knowledge of how the relevant courts interpreted these words. While 
the researcher cannot know the extent to which the respondents made use of additional 
resources to look up the meanings of words before they submitted the survey, the data from the 
survey include idiosyncratic language in participants’ definitions of words in Set B, suggesting 
an extent of personal involvement.163 The results clearly show that the participants – the 
majority of which speak English as an additional language – understand contested words in the 
same way as the legal fraternity and an international community of English language users, as 
represented by the iWeb corpus.  
To claim, then, that ordinary meaning does not exist or that the concept is too vague to 
define would be unsubstantiated at this stage. Rather, it would be more accurate to argue – 
along with Slocum164 and Labuschagne165 – that the ordinary meaning concept is best attributed 
to a certain spectrum of society, that is, to astute persons who are mindful of fine distinctions 
in meaning. Therefore, instead of defining a ‘reasonable speaker’ as representative of the 
average person, careful attention should be given to defining a ‘reasonable speaker who is 
mindful of ordinary language’. In addition, the phenomenon of ordinary meaning should be 
redefined.166 
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reason, they argue that a court should have a clear notion of which ordinary meaning is relevant to the case in 
question. Their work confirms that ‘ordinary meaning’ should be redefined and potential types should be identified 
and described. See op cit note 82 at 1319–20; 1332 and 1342–43.  
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Of course, more information is necessary before such definitions and claims can be 
confirmed. The need for a study with a much wider scope and demographic representation is 
apparent in order to determine the extent to which – if at all – a distinction can be made between 
an average person and an astute person. Are these two different individuals? If so, do they 
understand words completely differently? The present study should also be replicated to see if 
a similar demographic composition will provide the same results, that is, a clear 
correspondence between the understanding of the courts and the public.  
The study in question also implies that ordinary meaning should perhaps be considered as 
the sense assigned to a word mostly unaided, that is, mainly dependent on an individual’s active 
vocabulary. In this regard, there is agreement between the outcome of this study and Smith and 
Holmes’s167 understanding of what ‘ordinary meaning’ entails, namely everyday speakers’ 
conceptualisations.       




I  DEMOGRAPHIC INFORMATION   
 
1. To what age group do you belong? 
 
 18-30 years 
 31-50 years 
 51-70 years 
 older than 70 years 
 
2. What level of education do you have?  
 
 high school diploma 
 post-school training without official documentation (accreditation)  
 post-school training with official documentation (accreditation)  
 tertiary diploma 
 bachelor's degree 
 postgraduate degree 
 schooling not completed 
                                                          
167 Smith op cit note 1 at 63. 
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3. In which field do you work?  
 
 I am a full-time student. 
 education (primary, secondary, tertiary, training, skills development, etc)  
 law (paralegal, lawyer, advocate, justice, etc) 
 medicine (receptionist, nurse, medical representative, doctor, specialist, therapist, 
paramedic, assistant, etc) 
 emergency services (fire and rescue, etc) 
 armed forces (police, army, navy, air force, correctional services, security services, 
etc)  
 building and construction 
 business (managerial, accounting, administration, procurement, etc) 
 IT  
 administration 
 project management 
 the arts (fine art, music, the written word, cinematography, photography, mixed 
media, etc) 
 government administration 
 I am unemployed (jobless, a pensioner).  
 other 
 
4. What language do you consider to be your first language? (This is the language you are the 
most comfortable and proficient in.)  
 
 isiZulu 
 isiXhosa  
 Afrikaans  
 Sesotho  
 Setswana 
 Sesotho sa Leboa 
 siSwati  
 Xitsonga  
 Tshivenda  
 isiNdebele  
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 English  
 other 
  
5. How proficient are you in South African English? Choose one option that best describes 
your proficiency.  
 
A1: I can understand and use basic words for daily needs. I can also introduce myself to 
others and follow basic conversations. It is easier for me to understand others than it is to 
express myself. 
A2: I can communicate simple and routine tasks, as required. I can also describe items and 
events by using simple words. I understand longer sentences and frequently use expressions 
related to basic topics. 
B1: I can understand the main points relating to familiar subject matter at work, school or in 
leisure activities. I can also deal with most situations when travelling in an area where 
English is widely spoken. In addition, I can produce texts on topics that are familiar to me 
and can describe experiences, events, dreams and hopes by using simple and clear language. 
B2: I can understand the main ideas in complex texts containing both concrete and 
abstract topics. I can also interact with a degree of fluency and spontaneity, which makes 
interaction with native speakers of English possible. In addition, I can produce clear, well-
structured texts on a wide range of topics and explain my viewpoint. 
C1: I can understand complex texts that include longer clauses and implicit meanings. I can 
also express ideas fluently and spontaneously without having to search for expressions. In 
addition, I can use language for social, professional and academic purposes and can produce 
clear, well-structured detailed texts on complex subject matter. 
C2: I can understand with ease everything written or spoken in the language. I can also 
summarise information from different written and spoken sources, that is, deconstructing and 
restructuring arguments. In addition, I can express myself fluently and precisely without 
hesitation. 
 
II  GIVEN DEFINITIONS   
 
Each word below has been given two possible definitions. Choose the option that you most 
agree with. (You may choose only one option.) 
 
6. Which one of the following two options better describes the meaning of the word 'parent'?  
 
(a) It is the biological father and mother of a child who is either a participant in the 
child’s life or who has no contact with or knowledge of the child. 
(b) It is the biological or adoptive father and mother of a child, or the child’s legal 
guardian, who is a participant in the child’s life. 
 
7. Which one of the following two options better describes the meaning of the word ‘value’?  
 
(a) In terms of property, it refers to a homeowner’s well-being and emotional comfort in 
relation to his/her property. 
(b) In terms of property, it refers to its financial worth or the amount considered to be its 
fair equivalent. 
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8. Which one of the following two options better describes the meaning of the word ‘strike’?  
 
(a) It is a group’s refusal to work in protest against low pay or bad working conditions. 
(b) It is a group’s use of violence and public disturbance to protest against low pay or bad 
working conditions. 
  
9. Which one of the following two options better describes the meaning of the word ‘crush’?  
 
(a) It means to change an object to something else entirely by applying force in the form 
of pressing or squeezing. 
(b) It means to break into smaller pieces, powder or liquid by applying force in the form 
of pressing or squeezing. 
 
10. Which one of the following two options better describes the meaning of the word 'grab'?  
 
(a) In terms of a crime, to grab something means that you take it without the owner’s 
noticing; there is no or little physical contact. 
(b) In terms of a crime, to grab something means that you take it by applying some 
degree of force and physical contact. 
 
III  THE MEANING OF SELECTED WORDS   
 
Define the following words. If any of these words is unfamiliar to you, you need to indicate 
this by writing, "I don't know". Do not use a dictionary or similar resource to find the 
meaning. 
 
Briefly describe the following terms in your own words: 
 
11. Briefly describe - in your own words - what the word here below means.  
'export' (verb) 
 
12. Briefly describe - in your own words - what the word here below means.  
'money' (noun) 
 
13. Briefly describe - in your own words - what the word here below means.  
'road' (noun) 
 
14. Briefly describe - in your own words - what the word here below means.  
'absence' (noun) 
 









CONTRIBUTOR NAME           Terrence R Carney    
             
CONTRIBUTOR ADDRESS       Department of Afrikaans & Theory of Literature, Winnie Madikizela- 
Mandela Building 10-91, University of South Africa, Muckleneuk, 
Pretoria 2000 
     
ARTICLE TITLE                           A legal fallacy? Testing the ordinariness of ‘ordinary meaning’            
('the Contribution') 
 
To be published in      South African Law Journal   
('the Journal') 
 
published by Juta & Co Ltd, 21 Dreyer Street, Claremont, SOUTH AFRICA  ('the Publishers') 
 
 
1. I warrant that the Contribution is my original work, has not been published before, that I have 
obtained all necessary permissions for reproduction, if any, not owned by me, that the Contribution 
contains no illegal statements and does not infringe on the rights of others, and agree to indemnify 
the Publishers and Editorial Board of the Journal against any claims in respect of the above 
warranties. 
 
2. I warrant that this Contribution has been submitted for consideration to this Journal only. I agree that 
I will only submit the Contribution for consideration to another Journal if this Journal decides, after 
due consideration, not to publish this Contribution.  
 
3. I hereby grant to the Publishers the exclusive right and licence to publish and reproduce and further 
to license the Contribution to all media in all languages for the legal term of copyright throughout the 
world.  
 
4. I agree that the Editorial Board of the Journal may copy-edit the Contribution as it deems advisable 
for publication in the Journal and that I shall proofread proofs of the Contribution and indicate any 
proposed corrections or other changes and timeously return them to the Journal as directed. If 
corrected proofs are not timeously returned, the Publishers may proceed with the publication as it 
deems appropriate.  
 
5. I agree that the Publishers may seek payment of fees from corporate bodies or individuals for the 
privilege of making copies of the Contribution from the conventional printed form or from 
Contributions stored electronically. 
 
6. I agree that I will receive an electronic PDF copy of the Contribution. I acknowledge that I will be 
receiving no royalties or reproduction fees for the Contribution.  
 
7. Reproduction of the Contribution: 
 
i. Once the Contribution has been accepted for publication by the Journal, you may post the 
accepted version (version 1) of the Contribution in the repository of your institution or on your own 
website after 6 months of first publication of the Contribution. The accepted version of your article 
is the version that has been subjected to the refereeing process and, subject to 
amendment/correction, has been formally accepted by the Journal Editorial Committee for 
publication in the Journal.  
ii. You may not post the accepted version (version 1) of the Contribution in any repository other than 
that listed above (i.e. you may not deposit in the repository of another institution or a subject 
repository) until 18 months after first publication of the Contribution in the journal. 
iii. You may use the published Contribution (version 2) for your own teaching needs or to supply on 
an individual basis to research colleagues, provided that such supply is not for commercial 
purposes. The published version is the version that has undergone the final editing and typesetting 
process and has been published in the print and/or electronic Journal.   
iv. You may use the published Contribution (version 2) in a book authored or edited by you at any 
time after publication in the journal. This does not apply to books where you are contributing a 
chapter to a book authored or edited by someone else. 
v. You may post the Abstract of the published Contribution (version 2) on any website at any time, 
provided that full acknowledgment is given to the Journal; 
vi. You may not post the published Contribution (version 2) on a website or in a repository without 
permission from JUTA AND COMPANY. 
vii. When posting or re-using the Contribution, please provide a link to the appropriate DOI for the 
published version of the Contribution (if applicable) and please make the following 
acknowledgement: The final, definitive version of this paper has been published in [Journal], 
Vol/Issue, Month/Year published by JUTA AND COMPANY, All rights reserved. 
 
 
Signed in Pretoria on 25 March 2020. 
 
 
 
 
 
